Dwelling on the benefits of bad law

Andrew Arden QC comments on the recent Supreme Court decision in R (ZH & CN) v Newham LBC and Lewisham LBC

 

Introduction

Homeless persons advisers are rightly aghast at the Supreme Court decision in R (o/a ZH & CN) v. Newham LBC & Lewisham LBC [2014] UKSC 62, upholding the Court of Appeal in that case and the earlier cases of Mohamed v Manek and Kensington and Chelsea LBC (1995) 27 H.L.R. 439, CA, Desnousse v Newham London Borough Council [2006] EWCA Civ 547; [2006] QB 831; [2006] H.L.R. 38: I appeared for the appellants and I certainly am! The delay in commenting on it reflects the need for my blood temperature to reduce from boiling point to a mere simmer!

 

Contradictions

The decision is on any take a considerable stretch: in order to uphold the proposition that landlords (their agents and employees) can evict people housed under the temporary duties in Part 7, Housing Act 1996, without the court order otherwise required by s.3, Protection From Eviction Act 1977 (something that in practice authorities and other social landlords never actually do themselves – mostly because officers will not be willing to run the risk of committing a criminal offence, whether under s.1, 1977 Act or otherwise but also because of the risk of adverse publicity), the majority held that the purpose of an arrangement (the agreed test under s.3, 1977 Act) was not for the property to be used as a dwelling, even if it was intended to be used as a residence, although

(a) cases such as Uratemp Ventures Ltd. v. Collins [2001] UKHL 43; [2002] 1 AC 301; (2001) 33 H.L.R. 35 mandated that a broad approach be taken to the meaning of dwelling,

(b) it had been held in Mohamed v. Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2001] UKHL 57; [2002] 1 AC 547; [2002] H.L.R. 7, that a person in temporary accommodation resides in the area where it is located,

(c) Housing Acts 1980 and 1985 had specifically excluded such accommodation arrangements from secure status for a year from the decision (see 1985, Sch.1, para.4, as enacted), as had s.1, Housing Act 1988 from assured status, as s.209, Housing Act 1996, continues to do, which meant that Parliament must assumed that they would otherwise be “let as a separate dwelling” (the key definitional criterion under all these Acts) which has to include let as a dwelling,

(d) s.3A, 1977 Act specifies what tenancies and licences are excluded from s.3, including analogous accommodation such as holiday lettings, accommodation for immigrants and asylum seekers, displaced persons and hostels run by local authorities or other social landlords, but not including Part 7 accommodation, and

(e) use of the accommodation was nonetheless as a dwelling for the purposes of the housing benefit legislation (s.130, Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992).

 

If any one point emphasises to what extent the majority was prepared to go it is this last: it was essential to uphold qualification for housing benefit, absent which these schemes would not have been viable at all. Accordingly, it concluded that the accommodation was not for the purpose of use as a dwelling (under the 1977 Act), but was actually used as a dwelling (under the 1992 Act), even though, as Lady Hale (in the minority) pointed out:

“it is difficult to see a distinction between the two: [they] used these premises for the purpose for which they were licensed to occupy them” (at [156]).

“Many (indeed one suspects the great majority) of those provided with temporary accommodation under Part 7 of the 1996 Act are in receipt of housing benefit. The whole system of funding local authorities’ duties under the 1996 Act would fall apart if housing benefit were not available to those who cannot afford to pay for the (often expensive) temporary accommodation arranged for them. Section 130 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 provides that a person is entitled to housing benefit if he is ‘liable to make payments in respect of a dwelling…which he occupies as his home’. If the temporary and transient nature of his occupation is not sufficient to prevent the dwelling being his home for this purpose, I find it very difficult indeed to see how that same temporary and transient nature is sufficient to prevent the licence under which he is permitted to occupy the dwelling also being for the purpose of his occupying it as his home, that is, dwelling or residing or living rather than merely staying there” (at [162]).

 

 

Policy-led

The decision was hugely policy led. As well as Lady Hale, the Deputy President, the minority comprised Lord Neuberger, the President, who observed that the provisions:

“do not represent a substantial incursion into the property rights of the owners of premises, and they reflect a policy that people who have been lawfully living in premises should not be summarily evicted or locked out. Because of the nature of the rights accorded by these provisions and their aim of protecting people against the inconvenience and humiliation of being deprived of their homes summarily, one would expect the two sections to have a wide, rather than a narrow, meaning, a conclusion supported by the passages which I have referred to in the opinions in Uratemp” (at [135]).

 

He concluded,

“I accept that, when considering the proper interpretation of a statute, a court can, and where appropriate should, take into account policy considerations, and I sympathise with the view that policy considerations favour dismissing these appeals… However, judges have to be very careful before adopting an interpretation of a statute based on policy considerations, and should only to do so where those considerations point clearly in one direction. In this case, it seems to me to be particularly difficult to justify dismissing the appeal on policy grounds, given that (i) it involves departing from the natural meaning of the relevant statutory words, (ii) the policy argument is not overwhelming, (iii) there are policy considerations pointing the other way, and (iv) Parliament has apparently considered the policy – in section 3A” (at [153]).

 

Lady Hale rejected the authorities’ argument based on earlier case-law.

“Counsel… have put in considerable work in order to persuade us that the words must be read in the light of the construction given to similar (but not identical) wording in other provisions in the Rent Acts. For the reasons given by Lord Neuberger, which I need not repeat, I do not find any of that work persuasive, let alone convincing. I share his view that ‘dwelling’ is at least as wide as ‘residing’.” ([158]).

“The answer to the practical problems is a properly tailored legislative exception, as has already been provided for some other situations in section 3A of the 1977 Act” (at [165]).

 

Silver Linings

The irony is that the decision will probably cost authorities more – possibly much more – than they will save. As well as contending that the arrangements fell within s.3, 1977 Act, there was a subordinate argument, that – under Art.8 – any eviction from a home by a public authority must be by way of court order, relying not so much on the recent case-law (though that too) as on the origins of the Convention itself: would Strasbourg really uphold the notion that public authorities could simply come along with no judicial oversight and throw people into the street?

 

While rejecting this argument, the majority nonetheless concluded:

“…the decisions of this court in 2011, in Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2011] 2 A.C. 104; [2011] H.L.R. 7 and Hounslow London Borough Council v Powell [2011] UKSC 8; [2011] 2 A.C. 186; [2011] H.L.R. 23 extended the powers of the county court when hearing applications by a local authority to recover possession of a property in order to comply with article 8 of ECHR. It appears to me that it is necessary for the same reason to interpret section 204 of the 1996 Act as empowering that court to assess the issue of proportionality of a proposed eviction following an adverse section 184 decision (if the issue is raised) and resolve any relevant dispute of fact in a section 204 appeal. As there is no other domestic provision involving the court in the repossession of the accommodation after an adverse decision, the section 204 appeal, which reviews the authority’s decision on eligibility for assistance, is the obvious place for the occupier of the temporary accommodation to raise the issue of the proportionality of the withdrawal of the accommodation. …” (at [71]).

 

This was not what the authorities (or Secretary of State) – let alone the appellants – has submitted, so there was no argument about it, nor citation of previous cases such as Ali v. Birmingham CC [2010] UKSC 8; [2010] 2 A.C. 39; [2010] H.L.R. 22 and Bubb v. Wandsworth LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 1285; [2012] H.L.R. 13 as to the limits of a s.204 appeal.

 

The implications of this are considerable. While the s.204 appeal is limited in its scope, if the occupier wants to challenge the proportionality of the eviction (even on the basis, e.g. that the conduct which led to an intentionality decision did not happen, or that the facts germane to a finding that s/he is not vulnerable, or that an offer was unreasonably refused), the court will have to conduct a fact-finding exercise which means longer hearings, adjournments for public funding and much greater cost.

 

Conclusion

The decision means that private landlords, their agents and employees, can peremptorily evict some of the most vulnerable members of society from their homes, even if only temporary homes (but temporary here may well have meant months); the practice has not hitherto been widespread, but is bound to become so; it is arrived at by an analysis of case-law, wholly undermined by the dissenting judgment of Lord Neuberger (who is, after all, the most authoritative spokesperson on landlord-tenant, having been one of its leading practitioners throughout his career); the absurdity of holding that the accommodation was not intended to be occupied as a dwelling for one purpose while actually being occupied (as intended) for another is the sort of distinction that brings the law into disrepute; and, its root in a free-standing approach to policy rather than the legislation itself is a dangerous precedent.

 

It is also, and perhaps above all, a mean decision: let’s save a few more pounds at who knows (or cares) what cost of indignity and suffering to what may be the most vulnerable members of society of all – those whom the authorities refuse to assist into the basic amenity of a place to live.

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No Surprises – Gatekeeping

Andrew Arden QC and Clare Cullen consider gatekeeping and the recent Crisis “mystery shopper” report.

 

Gatekeeping remains prevalent amongst many local authorities finds the Crisis report, Turned Away, The treatment of single homeless people by local authority homeless services in England, October 2014. It is unsurprising; anecdotally, reports of local authorities sending homeless applicants away without taking an application or providing interim accommodation are commonplace. Nevertheless, the report is still depressing to read.

 

Threshold

Local authorities are under a duty to make inquiries where they have “reason to believe” that a person “may be” homeless or threatened with homelessness (ss.183(1) and 184(1), Housing Act 1996) and to provide interim accommodation where they have “reason to believe” that a person “may be” homeless, eligible for assistance and in priority need (s.188(1), 1996 Act). For both these duties, it is universally accepted that the threshold is designedly low.

The report

The report sets out the experiences of “mystery shoppers” who presented as homeless to sixteen local authorities across the country. The participants presented as single applicants, i.e. without any dependent children conferring an automatic priority need, and were given characteristics intended to give rise to a potential priority need so as to meet the threshold for further inquiries to be made and interim accommodation. The characteristic included:

  • A person with learning difficulties and mental health issues who claimed to have been unlawfully evicted;
  • A person who claimed to have suffered domestic violence from their ex-partner or step-father, approaching a local authority outside of the area where they had previously resided and were attacked;
  • A person claiming to be a rough sleeper in his or her 30s;
  • A 19-year old who claimed to have been forced to leave the parental home because of overcrowding.

 

In all, there were 87 visits spread across the different authorities. In each case, the process was found to be confusing and participants often left without knowing whether or not a homeless application had in fact been made! The report says that one participant described the process as “Kafkaesque”. Only on eight out of 87 visits was there any mention of the opportunity to make a homeless application.
Gatekeeping was a particular problem in London: in 29 visits, participants were not assessed at all, and the process taken no further, either on the ground that they were not in priority need or that they had provided insufficient proof of identity or other paperwork. The first of these is entirely unsound: by s.183, Part 7 applies whenever an applicant applies whom the authority have reason to believe is homeless – priority need is not a pre-condition; not only is the applicant who is not in priority need entitled to appropriate advice and assistance – preceded by an assessment (see 1.192(4)) with information about the likelihood of accommodation being available in the area appropriate to the applicant’s assessed needs (with details about location and sources of accommodation) – see s.192(5)) but there is also a power to house notwithstanding the absence of priority need (se.192(3)) which, as a matter of law, the authority must consider exercising (even if most will rarely decide to do so)..

 

In only 37 out of the 87 national visits was assistance actually provided: in 27 visits, temporary accommodation was offered pending inquiries; in 20 visits, a priority need was accepted; and in 10 visits, assistance was afforded to help the participant to return to a previous address until temporary accommodation could be offered. In the majority of visits, however, participants received limited or no support.

 

It follows that in a majority of cases there was an unlawful failure properly to apply the1996 Act.

 

Approach of the courts

Gatekeeping is not new (see, for example, Audit Commission, Homelessness: Responding to the new agenda, 2003) and it has occasionally come to the attention of the courts.

 

In R (on the application of Colin Raw) v London Borough of Lambeth [2010] EWHC 507 (Admin), Mr Raw presented as homeless and the local authority offered him an opportunity to participate in a private rented deposit scheme rather than make or continue with his homeless application. Although permission for judicial review was refused on the basis that the claim was academic as the authority had accepted an application and subsequently a s.193(2) duty, Stadlen J at [77], pointed out that the benefits of the deposit scheme were:

“not equivalent to and may not be an adequate substitute for….the benefits to a Part VII applicant of the duty to provide interim accommodation under section 188.”

 

In R (Kelly, Mehari & JI) v Birmingham City Council [2009] EWHC 3240 (Admin), Hickinbottom J, at [40]-[41], found that the local authority’s practice and procedures meant that officers were failing to apply s.188 when considering whether to provide interim accommodation:

“The approach of the Council to their obligations under Section 188 at the very least lacks legal coherence and a proper consideration of the relevant Section 188 criteria. So far as the Council are concerned that failure had and, insofar as that practice continues, continues to have, the effect of avoiding their obligations under Section 188 of the 1996 Act.”

 

More recently, in R (on the application of IA) v City of Westminster Council [2013] EWHC 1273 (Admin Court), a case concerning a homeless applicant who had been subjected to mental and physical torture in Iran who presented to the authority with a letter from his GP detailing, amongst other matters, that he suffered from depression, panic attacks and insomnia but who was issued with a negative s.184 decision on the same day, avoiding the duty to provide interim accommodation, HHJ Anthony Thornton QC stated at [25] that:

“Where, as in this case, it appears that the applicant is depressed, alone, unable readily to cope with day-to-day living tasks, unemployed and possibly unemployable, has no settled links with England or the English way of life and has minimal support mechanisms at his disposal, the inquiries would be expected to extend to a detailed inquiry into the applicant’s way of life prior to his homelessness……it would have been impossible for any of these inquiries to be undertaken in this case during the initial screening interview.”

 

As these cases demonstrate, when the issue of gatekeeping comes before the courts, judges are not supportive of local authorities. There will, however, be many cases of gatekeeping which never reach the courts: more often than not, it can be assumed that applicants won’t have access to legal advice or know their rights, and gatekeeping practices can take place without any repercussions for the local authority. If a challenge is issued or threatened in respect of gatekeeping, an application is usually then accepted or interim accommodation provided by the local authority so that the claim becomes academic and is no longer pursued.

 

What is the solution?

As highlighted in Crisis’ report, in England, there is no compulsory and audited quality framework or inspection of housing options and homelessness services. This is in contrast to Scotland where the Scottish Regulator has responsibility for undertaking inspections of homelessness services. Whilst in April 2013, the Government introduced a new Gold Standard for homelessness support initiatives and, in 2011, the Local Government Ombudsman was critical of local authority gatekeeping practices, offering guidance in Homelessness: How councils can ensure justice for homeless people, Focus Report: learning lessons from complaint, these measures appear to have done little to address gatekeeping practices.

 

At present, therefore, it is left to organisations such as Crisis to highlight gatekeeping. Not only is this type of report likely to be costly and time-consuming, there are also potential risks: under s.214, 1996 Act, it is an offence knowingly or recklessly to make a statement which is false in a material particular with intent to induce an authority, in connection with the exercise of their functions under Pt 7, to believe that he is entitled to accommodation or assistance under Part 7. To avoid this, all local authorities were contacted prior to the visits and informed that they would take place and notified after the visits so as to remove the details of the “mystery shopper.”

 

It is perhaps only fair to acknowledge that the prevalence of gatekeeping is likely to be part of the much wider problem of lack of resources both in terms of staffing and available properties. If properties are not available or front line officers are inadequately trained or understaffed, gatekeeping will inevitably continue to take place. Whilst these underlying issues need to be addressed (see May 15 – the Home Stretch<http://laghousinglaw.com/2014/10/14/may-2015-the-home-stretch/>), there can be no excuse for these practices: however they want to dress it up, they comprise the refusal by authorities to do the job that Parliament has imposed on them – put like that, it is not merely a question of illegality but one of failing to recognise their own raison d’être: they are there to provide the services Parliament deems to be needed, for the people Parliament identifies, not for those they choose.

There may be an argument for greater regulation – as in Scotland and as recommended in the report – but it is, for those who admire local government – a very great shame if regulation is needed for authorities to be compelled to perform their functions (as opposed to how they perform them): no more than authorities themselves should homelessness officers have any part of it.

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May 2015, the Home Stretch

Andrew Arden QC and Clare Cullen consider the proposals for housing from the three main political parties

Homes for Britain Campaign

The Homes for Britain campaign has a simple message – the next Government must commit to ending the housing crisis within a generation and to publishing a long-term plan to achieve that aim within a year of taking office.

That there is a housing crisis can no longer be ignored. The frustration it causes, which has been bubbling beneath the surface for a long time, was in the public spotlight during the Focus E15 mothers’ campaign a few weeks ago: empty flats in east London were occupied, in part, in protest at the lack of social housing in the area. The media interest in that case may be a cause for optimism – is the housing crisis finally filtering through to the political and media agenda?

 

The scale of the problem

A joint report from KPMG and Shelter, Building the homes we need, A programme for the 2015 government, estimates that 250,000 new homes a year are needed in England alone: in 2013, just under 110,000 were built. Not since 1987 has the number of new homes in England exceeded 200,000 per year; you have to go back to 1977 to exceed 250,000 (see DCLG, Live Table 244). Radical, comprehensive and long-term plans are required if anything like that level is to be achieved again.

The drop in new homes has been largely due to the steady decline in local authority building. In 1978, local authorities were responsible for completing 93,310 new homes; 39% of the total that year. This number declined to 840 by 2013. This wouldn’t necessarily be a problem if housing associations or the private sector had filled the gap but that simply hasn’t happened. Whilst the number of new homes built by housing association has increased, 21,610 in 2013, it is nowhere near the level that local authorities used to provide.

As for the private sector, it has rarely exceeded 150,000 since 1978 (only exceeding between 1987-1989 and in 2007) and has remained below 100,000 since 2009. This is unsurprising. As this blog has previously noted, the private sector will never supply enough “for the very simple reason that the return on investment takes so long – decades – that it is inherently uncertain, vulnerable both to financial market forces and to political shifts in residential landlord-tenant law” (Rent Control to Major Debt).

Any plan for increasing the number of new homes must include new homes within the social housing sector. Despite the changes to Part 6, Housing Act 1996 (introduced by Localism Act 2011), allowing local authorities once more to maintain closed waiting lists, waiting lists remain high (in 2013, just below 1.7 million). It is simply not possible, or economically sound, to rely more and more on private sector housing, which seems to be current policy, to fill the gap. Not only is the private sector not building more homes, but housing those who would traditionally have been accommodated in the social rented sector in private rented accommodation simply results in the benefit bill shooting up, money which could be spent investing in new homes. As set out in Shelter’s report, Bricks or benefits? Rebalancing housing investment, May 2012, reliance on the private sector has increased the cost of housing benefit significantly: it is estimated that if just 8 per cent of housing benefit claimants in private rented housing moved to affordable social homes, the Government would save £200 million.
Public support

It is often suggested that there is insufficient public support for new-build housing, particularly social housing, both because of NIMBY-ism and for public spending reasons. A recent study by the Fabian society, Silent Majority: How the public will support a new wave of social housing, September 2014, suggests otherwise: albeit using a relatively small data set through focus groups, the study found 57% in support and only 15% opposed to new social housing being built; it also found that concerns about NIMBY-ism may be misplaced, although opposition rose to 27% when participants were asked about building social housing in their area but the percentage of those in support remained higher, at 44%, with 23% undecided either way.

There is another reason, not touched on in the Fabian report. The number of adults who are still living in their parents homes – whether having moved back in or never having moved out – is at an all-time high (at any rate in recent times), as a current television programme calls it, The Hotel of Mum and Dad: “since 1996 the UK has seen the number of 20-34 year olds living with their parents grow by 25%, to reach 3.35 million in 2013 – 72% of whom are in work” (Building the homes we need, p.25). Of course, enjoying the company of one’s children for a much longer period of time than used to be the case (when, say, they either did not return from university, or only briefly) is a joy – but not necessarily an unqualified one): there are also frequent reports about how much of their savings parents are spending to help their children into owner-occupation!

This surely provides an incentive for all parties to start putting new homes, including those within the social housing sector, at the top of the political agenda.

 

Policies

The first stage in the Homes for Britain Campaign was the autumn party conferences. So, what are the current proposals of the three main parties to address this issue? We have picked a couple from each.

Conservative

Unsurprisingly, it is the Conservative Party who offer the least by way commitment to building new social housing; if this had been a priority, it would surely have already been addressed: to the contrary, the capital investment funding for social housing was reduced by 60% in the Spending Review in 2010 while the Right to Buy – responsible for a substantial part of the decline in the social housing stock – has been stimulated by increased discounts.

  • Expansion of Help to Buy One policy in which the Government continues to invest is the Help-to-Buy scheme; this applies to first-time buyers under 40 who purchase a new home and operate by way of an equity loan of 20% of the price. It is intended to build 100,000 new homes on brown field sites for this purpose. To encourage developments, they would be exempt from restrictions under s.106, Town and Country Planning Act 1990, agreements. This, however, is not going to do much for those in need of social housing as it is the s.106 agreements which have introduced the requirement for a proportion of social housing in all new developments. In other words, in place of that proportion – which guaranteed that the housing would go to those who qualified for social housing (through social landlord allocation) – the housing will go to those who can find the remaining equity, e. the better off amongst those in need.
  • Further Benefit Cap Benefits will be capped at £23,000 (down from £26,000). Whilst this is not a policy directed at new homes, it is a further attack on those who are potentially the most in need (large families) and some housing associations have already warned of potential knock on effects; if tenants are unable to pay rent due to the application of the benefit cap, housing associations will not have the funds, or will have difficulty accessing funds, to invest in new social housing.

Labour

Labour are seeking to develop a long-term plan to address the housing crisis, broadly in line with the campaign, albeit that there are as yet no real details about how they propose to do so.

  • Target to build 200,000 new homes a year by 2020 This is still short of what is required but at least looks like an attempt to formulate a long-term, sustainable plan. Sir Michael Lyons has been commissioned to lead a review for the party but this has not yet been published.
  • Cap on rent increases This policy was announced earlier this year and was the subject of comment in the post Rent Control to Major Debt. Such a measure could help prevent the housing benefit bill from increasing because of the high costs of rent in the private sector, savings which could then be used to invest in building more homes.

Liberal Democrats

The Liberal Democrats appear to be the most radical in their proposals.

General Election

The proposals are still a long way off what is required. Will the remaining six months before the General Election see the parties fully develop their plans (or be persuaded to formulate a plan) to tackle the housing crisis, or will housing – as it always seems to do – be submerged by other, putatively more pressing issues? What do you think?

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Retaliatory Eviction – a solution?

Andrew Arden QC and Clare Cullen consider the new proposals to deal with retaliatory eviction.

Introduction

This blog has previously commented on retaliatory evictions of assured shorthold tenants (see Retaliatory Eviction”, August 13, 2012, and We shall not be moved, March 18, 2014). The Citizens Advice Bureau’s report, The tenant’s dilemma”, June 2007, proposed giving a judge discretion to “overrule” a section 21 notice where the tenant raised and proved a case of retaliatory eviction. In “Review of Property Conditions in the Private Rented Sector”, February 2014, DCLG suggested that any restriction on a section 21 notice should be reserved for “serious cases of disrepair” only (e.g. category 1 hazards).

Sarah Teather’s Private Members’ Bill (The Tenancies (Reform) Bill 2014-15) is the first active step in this area and, on September 11, 2014, the Government announced that it was supporting the Bill “in principle” albeit that its support is on condition that it “only targets bad landlords and cannot be used by tenants to frustrate legitimate evictions.”

Draft Bill

Notice following action by local authority

The Bill is exclusively concerned with assured shorthold tenants rather than any others who have no – or no real – security. Under its cl.1, if relevant condition is met, a s.21, Housing Act 1988, notice qualifies as retaliatory eviction and, as such, is intended to be wholly ineffective. The condition is that the s.21 notice is given within six months of service by the local authority of one of a number of specified disrepair notices (improvement notice under ss.11 or 12, hazard awareness notice under ss.28 or 29, notice of emergency remedial action under s.40(7), all of Housing Act 2004).

As drafted, the proposal would not be restricted to retaliatory eviction in the context of disrepair; of course, a landlord could always serve a s.8 notice for, e.g., arrears, but if the retaliation is because the tenant has dome something which the landlord does not like, there is no apparent room for manoeuvre. This is probably a good thing but, on the other hand, might incline the courts to come up with their own limits which, in turn, may be risky.

Whether or not for that reason, another problem is that the way the proposal is drafted does not entirely rule out the possibility that the courts will treat the s.21 notice as valid from after the six month period; while this is unlikely, so were some of the decisions on the deposit laws – which effectively gutted the provisions – before their amendment by statute, and it would be preferable to spell out the consequences than to leave them to be explored by the courts.

Disrepair complaint

A second category of retaliatory eviction arises when a s.21 notice is served within six months of a written complaint to the landlord about disrepair in the premises, meaning disrepair within s.11, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, or premises in such a state as to be prejudicial to the health of the occupants (statutory nuisance). For this provision to take effect there must be either a category 1 or “relevant” category 2 hazard in the premises (to be prescribed). The complaint must have been in writing. The disrepair must not be the tenant’s responsibility (which excludes an act or omission consisting of normal domestic usage of the premises).

The provision is not well drafted: it is left unclear whether the condition has to have existed at the date of the written complaint or as at the date when the notice is issued or even as at the date of hearing.

To prove that a hazard (of either kind) existed, a certificate from the local housing authority will be conclusive evidence but it is also unclear whether a tenant could choose to prove the condition in some other way, e.g. independent, expert evidence. Either way, this is something of a hurdle, but it is exacerbated by a somewhat surprising – not to say unprecedented – provision that the s.21 notice is not prohibited if the landlord does not consider that the relevant condition is met, in which case (lending credibility but probably not certainty to the proposition that independent evidence is admissible) a certificate of the authority confirming the condition appears to be necessary, i.e. the only way to prove the condition. This may be difficult to obtain although ancillary provisions include regulations which (among other matters) must address local authority responses, prescribed form of certificate and what matters are to be treated as the tenant’s responsibility.

Gas Safety and Energy Performance Certificates

Landlords have obligations in relation to gas safety and energy performance, including the supply of certificates to the tenant: no s.21 notice may be served so long as a landlord is in breach of the duty to provide those certificates.

Section 21 notices

It is proposed both that these should be in prescribed form, and that they should have a limited life (six months), the latter presumably so as to end the practice of serving notice immediately after the grant (also see “We shall not be moved”).

Fitness for Human Habitation

Finally, it is proposed to amend s.8, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, to require shorthold premises to be fit for human habitation at the commencement of the tenancy, and for the landlord to maintain them as such throughout the tenancy – although, oddly, this is not in itself a ground for barring a notice (nor is unfitness under the 1985 Act synonymous either with s.11 or a hazard under the 2004 Act: to the contrary, the 1985 Act adheres to the unsatisfactory unfitness laws which the Housing Health and Safety Rating System replaced).

Comment

The Bill is good news but it badly needs re-drafting and – now that the government has said it will support it – that is something that will be undertaken: how much of the substance of the Bill survives that exercise may, however, be a different question.

Nor does the Bill go far enough: the involvement of the local authority in both the principal provisions means that – as observed in the post We shall not be moved” – it will be something of a postcode lottery; proving the condition for the “complaint” proposal otherwise than through the authority will be costly and public funding will probably not be available and, in any event, buys no more than an additional six months, although the reality may well be less because the six month time limit dates from the notice or complaint, so that notice can be re-served as soon as it is up, which may be only three or four months from when the “bad” (prohibited, retaliatory) notice itself was given.

These criticisms may seem churlish but the danger is that if the proposals are ineffective – because they have not been thought fully through or drafted carefully enough to make them worth operating – it sets back the cause of a much sounder, more protective approach, just because they do not work. The Bill needs much, much more attention – and from supportive hands – before it goes further.

The reality is probably that the Bill will not become law before the next election: its best use may yet be to force the issue of retaliatory eviction onto the agendas of all parties so that, whoever wins, at least some protection against this activity does finally arrive.

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Summertime… but the living ain’t easy!

Andrew Arden QC & Robert Brown

The bedroom tax is now 16 months’ old. Publication of a new report shows that it is not working.

We considered part of the Government’s package of benefit reductions (or “reforms” as the Government insists on calling them) a few months ago, in ‘Being for the benefit of Mr Tight’. One of the key measures is the bedroom tax. To recap, the bedroom tax is implemented by regs A13 and B13 of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/213) (as inserted by the Housing Benefit (Amendment) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012/3040)). It requires local housing authorities to calculate the housing benefit payable to social housing tenants by, inter alia, reference to the number of bedrooms for which the claimant is eligible, defined by the number of occupiers of the property – for instance, a couple are expected to share a bedroom; likewise, two children under the age of 10 are expected to share. If the property contains an extra bedroom, the housing benefit payable is reduced by 14 per cent; if two or more extra bedrooms, by 25 per cent.

As we noted back in April, the impact assessment supporting the amending regulations suggested no great financial savings, maybe even none. The theory behind the bedroom tax was that under-occupied social housing should be freed up in order to allow families to move out of over-crowded housing. As we said then

“In reality, it is not so simple: there are many more cases where an extra bedroom is legitimately required than the Regulations provide for; and, it is outright ignorant to assume that moving is simple or in many cases even possible, especially if a social landlord (offering an affordable rent) does not have (or is not willing to offer) an appropriate, smaller property. Thus, there is no qualification on the reduction that smaller, affordable accommodation is available, or that the local housing authority will make it available. …

“We do not need to rely on our experience of working with social landlords and tenants to know just how exceptional it is to be able to make this sort of home-swap. Not only is it general knowledge but it was also the predictable consequence of an increasingly-capped housing benefit system that more and more private landlords would cease to accommodate tenants dependent on it.”

You no longer need to just take our word for it: DWP has now published an interim report, Evaluation of Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy, which looks at the first six months of the bedroom tax. A final report is promised for 2015 but for now there is much to take from the interim report.

Discretionary housing payments (which, if Government is to be believed, are the solution to any discrimination caused by the bedroom tax) are not sufficient. The interim report notes that some disabled applicants for DHP have failed means tests applied by local authorities, because they are in receipt of disability benefits – even though those benefits are meant to help with some of the extra costs of having a long-term disability or health condition and are not intended to help with housing costs: see Burnip v Birmingham CC [2012] EWCA Civ 629; [2013] H.L.R. 1.

Another concern in relation to DHPs was that some benefit claimants affected by the bedroom tax had either failed to apply for a DHP altogether or failed to provide adequate evidence in support of their application, especially where there was a mental health condition.

Finally, so far as DHPs are concerned, awareness of their availability is too low: over half of those who were affected by the bedroom tax and had not applied for a DHP said that they were not aware of the possibility.

Tenants, meanwhile, are clearly struggling with the financial impacts: 57% say that they have spent less on household essentials, 21% that they have borrowed money from family or friends, 3% have borrowed money via a credit card, while 3% have borrowed money through a pay day loan. The researchers do not appear to have asked tenants whether they had borrowed from a loan shark, but we note that 2% of affected tenants said that they had taken some “other” action, which must raise concerns about the measures to which tenants are being forced to resort.

On the other hand, only 13% of tenants said that they had looked at moving to another social housing property. Just 3% said that they had looked at moving into the private rented sector although those who had done so did appear (according to the report) to have had some success: 1.4% of affected claimants (i.e. half those who had looked into it) moved out of social housing and into the private rented sector. The net result for the HB bill is fairly obvious.

Unsurprisingly, rent arrears have increased. While the interim report was careful not to attribute this directly to the bedroom tax, it is surely the most obvious candidate. The conclusion seems logical: 41% of affected tenants are reported as having paid the full shortfall; if 41% did…

And what does the interim report say about the grand aim of the bedroom tax: incentivising tenants to move to smaller properties and free up space for larger households? Very little, it seems. A mere 4.5% of affected claimants managed to move to a smaller property.

If the Government is concerned about wasted space, it is not even clear that the right people are being targeted. A recent research paper, ‘Quantifying the extent of space shortages: English dwellings’, has concluded that, if the Government wishes to identify oversized homes, the relationship between the number of inhabitants and the number of bedrooms is a poor metric to use. The researchers found that under-occupation was less common in dwellings where HB was paid and that most properties for which HB was paid were undersized when compared with the space standard adopted by the Greater London Authority for new-build homes. The researchers also found that, somewhat counter-intuitively, 75% of households who lost some HB due to the bedroom tax were undersized when compared with the space standard. Based on their analysis, only 19% of those affected by the bedroom tax actually had more space than they needed. One cause of the problem is that properties in the UK are simply too small: the UK has the smallest homes by floor area in Europe. As the research paper concludes

“the vast majority of homes are at or below acceptable space standards. This physical shortcoming has been mitigated by residents having low occupation rates, which are necessary and should not be regarded as a wasteful use of space.”

Assuming that the policy goal is a legitimate one, the bedroom tax fails to achieve it because the brute-force methodology does not identify those properties with excess space.

The future for the bedroom tax is uncertain. Labour have said that they would scrap it, while the Liberal Democrats have undergone a partial change of heart and no longer support its current implementation. Given the damage that is being done to tenants, and to the budgets of social landlords, the real question is whether change can await the final report and the general election.

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Measure Twice, Cut Once

Andrew Arden QC & Robert Brown

As Parliament prepares to amend legislation protecting tenancy deposits, we look at what this means for landlords and tenants and consider the lessons for legislators.

Tenancy deposit legislation: a brief history so far

The idea that a landlord taking a deposit from a tenant was free to do pretty much whatever he chose with the money have been around for a long time. In 1998, the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux published its report, Unsafe Deposit, which suggested that 48% of CAB clients surveyed had had a landlord unreasonably withhold some or all of the deposit in the previous five years. The Survey of English Housing for 2001/02 found that 69% of tenants who had not had any or all of their deposit returned felt that money had been unjustifiably withheld. While these figures should be treated with some caution – “after all, they would say that, wouldn’t they?” – they clearly gave rise to justified concern.

The sums involved are far from insignificant. In 2002, 70% of the 2.21 million private rented sector tenants had paid a deposit. The average deposit was around £510 (the equivalent of a month’s rent), leading to a calculation that around £790m was being held in deposits. As we have previously noted, the number of private rented sector tenancies has now risen to 4 million. The English Housing Survey reveals that the average rent in the private rented sector is now £163 per week, or a little over £700 per month. Assuming that the proportion of tenancies in which a deposit has been paid has remained stable at 70%, and assuming that the average deposit still represents a month’s rent, £1,960m is currently being held by way of tenancy deposits. Furthermore, as experience is that it is becoming increasingly common to ask for a deposit of more than one month’s rent (i.e. a second months’ deposit to cover the last month’s rent), the total is likely to be even higher.

The consequences for tenants can be more than just the obvious financial issues: Unsafe Deposit cited cases of households facing considerable hardship and even homelessness through their deposits being withheld, as they had no means to raise a deposit for the next property.

In 2000, a voluntary tenancy deposit scheme was set up by the Independent Housing Ombudsman. Take-up was very slow. In 2002, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister consulted on this issue in Tenancy money: probity and protection, saying that the failure of landlords to sign up to the voluntary scheme meant that a statutory scheme was being considered. Although a draft Housing Bill was published in March 2003, just a month after the consultation closed, it did not make any provision for tenancy deposits. In December 2003, a Bill was introduced to Parliament but there was still nothing covering tenancy deposits.

It was not until May 2004 that the then Minister for Housing and Planning announced that the Government would be bringing forward amendments to the Bill to cover tenancy deposits. Those amendments did not, however, materialise until a relatively late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament which had the unfortunate effect that, while the policy behind the measures had been consulted on, the technical detail of the legislation had not.

The tenancy deposit schemes provisions were ultimately passed as Pt 6, Ch.4, Housing Act 2004. Section 213(1) provided that where a landlord received a tenancy deposit in connection with an assured shorthold tenancy, he had to deal with the deposit in accordance with an authorised scheme. The initial requirements of the scheme had to be complied with within 14 days of receiving the deposit and a landlord had to provide his tenant with certain prescribed information within the same period. The prescribed information is to be found in the Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed Information) Order 2007 (SI 2007/797). It includes such matters as the contact details and procedures for the deposit scheme and identifying features of the tenancy.

The sanctions for non-compliance are found in ss.214 & 215. Where a deposit has been paid, but the landlord has failed to deal with it properly, the tenant could apply to the county court. The county court is empowered either to order the landlord to pay the deposit into a custodial scheme or to repay it to the tenant. The court was obliged to order the landlord to pay the tenant a sum equal to three times the amount of the deposit. Section 215 provides that a landlord who had not complied with the requirements relating to a deposit is unable to serve a notice under Housing Act 1988, s.21.

There are two types of tenancy deposit scheme: custodial and insurance. In a custodial scheme, the landlord pays the deposit over to the scheme administrator. The scheme administrator then keeps the deposit until the end of the tenancy, at which point it is returned to the landlord or tenant, as appropriate. In an insurance scheme, the landlord keeps the deposit. At the end of the tenancy, the landlord is required to make the appropriate repayment to the tenant, via the scheme administrator. The scheme administrator is also required to maintain insurance, to cover any shortfall if the landlord does not cooperate. There are authorised schemes of both types.

The tenancy deposit provisions came fully into force on 6 April 2007. They have been the subject of much subsequent litigation. Two Court of Appeal decisions substantially reduced the effect of the protective measures. First, in Tiensia v Vision Enterprises Ltd (t/a Universal Estates) [2010] EWCA Civ 1224; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 94; [2011] H.L.R. 10, the Court of Appeal held that where a landlord has failed to comply with the initial requirements of an authorised scheme, he will not be liable to pay the statutory penalty if the deposit is protected before a county court hears the application under s.214. Secondly, in Gladehurst Properties Ltd v Hashemi [2011] EWCA Civ 604; [2011] H.L.R. 36, it was held that a county court could not order a landlord to pay the statutory penalty if the tenancy had come to an end.

Parliament sought to reverse the effects of both decisions through amendments in Localism Act 2011. The time for complying with the initial requirements of a scheme and for serving the prescribed information was extended from 14 days to 30 days. If the landlord fails to comply within that 30 day period, the county court can award a statutory penalty even if the landlord does subsequently comply. This has the effect of reversing Tiensia. Amendments were also made allowing a tenant to make an application under s.214 after the tenancy had come to an end, thus reversing Hashemi. The statutory penalty was itself amended, however, to give county courts a discretion as to how much to order the landlord to pay to the tenant (within a range of one to three times the deposit).

Litigation around the 2004 Act has not abated. In Superstrike Ltd v Rodgrigues [2013] EWCA Civ 669; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 3848; [2013] H.L.R. 42, the parties had entered into a tenancy on 8 January 2007 (i.e. before the provisions of the 2004 Act came into force) for a term of 364 days. A deposit had been paid by the tenant. In January 2008 (i.e. after the provisions came into force), the fixed term came to an end and a statutory periodic tenancy arose under Housing Act 1988, s.5. The landlords retained the deposit. The Court of Appeal held that this amounted to a new tenancy and that the tenant was to be treated as having paid a deposit at that time. As the landlords had failed to take any steps to comply with the tenancy deposit scheme provisions, they were prevented from relying on a s.21 notice.

Left unclear was what would happen where a fixed term tenancy was entered into after the 2004 Act came into force, and the provisions were properly complied with: did the commencement of the statutory periodic tenancy comprise a new tenancy with the result that the provisions had to be complied with afresh?

As a response, the Government is now bringing forward further amendments to the tenancy deposit schemes legislation, which have been introduced to the Deregulation Bill currently progressing through Parliament.

The Deregulation Bill

At first glance, the Deregulation Bill may seem an odd vehicle for amending the tenancy deposit legislation. That may be so but the long title of the Bill says that it is designed to make “provision for the reduction of burdens resulting from legislation for businesses or other organisations or for individuals.” Those in the business of being landlords will hope that the amendments do relieve them of the considerable burden that Superstrike threw their way.

In its current form, cl.31 of the Bill would introduce four new sections into the 2004 Act, as 215A-215D.

Importantly, the new s.215A provides that the requirements in s.213 will apply to any AST where a deposit was received before 6 April 2007 and a statutory periodic tenancy has arisen on or after that date: that adopts Superstrike. Time for compliance in those circumstances is, however, extended to 90 days from the commencement date of these amendments, during which there is a period of grace the effect of which is that the reversal of Tiensia does not apply, i.e. if the landlord complies within this period, there will – in these Superstrike cases – be no penalty.

The new s.215B will also reduce a landlord’s burdens. It provides that where a deposit has been received in relation to a fixed-term AST and has been dealt with properly, there is no need for the landlord to re-comply where a statutory periodic tenancy arises. The new s.215C makes similar provision where a new fixed-term or contractual period tenancy is entered into.

A wider problem?

It is just over seven years since the tenancy deposit schemes provisions in the 2004 Act came into force. In that time, Parliament has already had to use the Localism Act 2011 to amend the legislation once. The second set of amendments, contained in the Deregulation Bill, are likely to become law soon. These changes have not been caused by some change in policy. The changes have been brought forward because the original legislation was not working as it had been intended to. Having realised this, Parliament attempted to fix the problem in 2011. It is clear from the need for further amendment that this was not successful.

Our intention here is not to criticise the policy – we could argue that it should go further (Shelter’s suggestion, in response to the 2002 consultation, of a single, national custodial scheme which directly collects and holds all deposits has much going for it), but the general thrust of the policy is in the right direction.

The lesson that we would like to see learned from of all of this is that although it is all very well consulting on policy options, it is not enough to ensure good legislation. Housing law is complex. The technical application of the law is, in practice, at least as important as the policy. As we have already noted, there was no consultation on the wording of the tenancy deposit scheme provisions. Hindsight is, of course, 20/20. Nonetheless, we are confident that at least some of the problems that have befallen the tenancy deposit schemes legislation could have been avoided if draft legislation had been made available for public consultation.

It is unfortunate that the Law Commission was not asked to become involved as by the time that it produced the draft Rented Homes Bill in 2006, it was already too late. In any event, while the Law Commission’s involvement would surely have been beneficial, this is not necessarily the type of work that it is designed for. While the Law Commission’s functions include law reform projects, these are invariably substantial, over-arching projects (such as “Renting Homes”). The tenancy deposit legislation called for something a bit different.

What would have been useful in the summer of 2004 is a consultative and advisory body that can focus on specific, discrete legislative topics while remaining able to consider them in the wider context. Perhaps the time has come for a Housing Law Commission? If the Government decides to proceed with legislation tackling retaliatory eviction, it will certainly be necessary to ensure that the legislation is both understandable and effective. Equally, we have previously suggested some areas of possible reform, such as licensing of landlords and letting agents and lettings to students.

You never know, if someone asks nicely we may even be persuaded to participate…

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Rent Control to Major Debt

(with apologies to David Bowie)

ANDREW ARDEN QC AND ROBERT BROWN

With house prices and rents unaffordably sky high, we wonder whether it is not time to think again about a method that was historically successful both for tenants and owner-occupiers – rent control.

As house prices sky-rocket and would-be owner-occupiers drift aimlessly in space with no hope of ever returning home, our thoughts turn wistfully to an era of rent controls when tenants could remain in accommodation at rents that they – and through housing benefit – the state could afford until they had saved enough to buy at a price that was not excessively inflated by scarcity.

When Ed Miliband recently spoke of tenancies with minimum terms of three years during which rent increases would be subject to an upper limit, the landlord lobby started to shriek “rent control” as a term of abuse. Strictly (oh so strictly) rent control in its legal sense referred back to the method of fixing rents abandoned in 1957 which had led to levels that were, we accept, unsustainable; but rent control in its popular sense, meaning controls on rent fixed either by realistic formula or an independent body (the Rent Officer), had much to recommend it and – if we look back now – we can see that it generated (over its tenure: 1965-1988) the climate in which the high rise in owner-occupation could follow

In short, if house-owners can make more money selling than renting, then hey, guess what, that’s what they’ll do. Market rents – under assured tenancies – will always go in only one direction (we won’t bother to say which – as if…!) unless and until building to rent is perceived as producing more profit for the construction industry which, we see historically time and time again, it never does, for the very simple reason that the return on investment takes so long – decades – that it is inherently uncertain, vulnerable both to financial market forces and to political shifts in residential landlord-tenant law.

With rent control, you know what you get; sure, it creates scarcity in the rental market, which is why fair rents (1965-1988) excluded scarcity value, and only functions if accompanied by relatively full security of tenure (1974-1988, following the abolition of the furnished tenancy exception) – i.e. exceptions for, e.g., truly temporary arrangements (holiday lettings, student lettings, fully-serviced lettings) and “personal” lettings (i.e. resident landlords, absentee owner-occupiers).

Traditionally, security has been applied to existing lettings: the flood of evictions would not be tolerable. The shrill cri de coeur of the small buy-to-let landlord is not politically acceptable in the run-up to an election but – if rents are properly set – the consequence is not that they lose money but that they lose the ability to make more each time the market rises and/or to evict in order to sell when that becomes their choix du jour. (Yes, one of us is just back from a holiday in France).

In any event, as an earlier post suggested – ALL IS FORGIVEN: BRING BACK THE FAIR RENT (and slash the social security bill, why don’t you?)! – it is not all or nothing: it would be possible to try out an exemption from security for, say, the landlord who only owns one or two properties (with appropriate definitions to minimise avoidance) while re-introducing fair rents.

There are as many houses beforehand as there are after rent control is introduced, and those which are not re-let are available for sale, at prices that, if not exactly affordable to everyone are a lot more affordable than now and that tenants will be able to save for if not having to pour every last penny into rent.

The point is this: the system worked; yes, there was homelessness, but nothing like today; yes, there were evasions and evictions but, again, nothing like now; just because it is an old system does not make it wrong – rent control didn’t cause the financial collapse – that was caused by bankers not landlords.

In some ways, it was all predictable and maybe even predicted. The Housing Act 1980 foreshadowed the end of protected tenancies – secure private lettings at fair rents – in two ways: it introduced the shorthold ground for possession, a mandatory ground fulfilled by compliance with procedural requirements; and, it introduced a new form of tenancy, in build-to-rent accommodation, based on Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 principles and as such let at market rents – they were called… “assured tenancies”.

This was the now forgotten first incarnation of the assured tenancy, forgotten not least because – and this is part of our core thesis (well, alright, if not thesis then story-line) – build to rent just does not work on any scale significant enough to make an impact. A massive failure, all that survived was the name, handed on like an unused wedding dress to a policy of market rents with no security, under the Housing Act 1988. (There is a tendency to treat assured shortholds as starting with the Housing Act 1996 presumption, but this really served to sweep up the few private landlords who had failed to keep pace with the practice adopted from 1988 by the better-informed).

A recent case in the Court of Appeal (Loveridge v. Lambeth LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 494; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 3390; [2013] H.L.R. 31, now en route to the Supreme Court) served to spotlight the intended effect: housing is as valuable when rented as to an owner-occupier; otherwise, the would-be owner-occupier could always outbid the would-be landlord. Again and again, with less rather than more sophistication than Charlie Brown, policy tries to drive house-building with promises of a rental return; again and again, it fails.

It didn’t work in 1980; it is not working now. Build to rent needs subsidies – and gets them (in the hands of social landlords); even the availability of social housing grants – subsidies – for otherwise unregistered landlords is not making any impact.

Everyone agrees we need more houses and that means building them. Everyone knows that to be sufficient, this means houses for sale. Common sense tells us that if people cannot save to buy, there will not be enough prospective owner-occupiers who can afford to buy, which means that there will be less available. It also tells us that if there is less available, it will cost more. True, house prices in many areas are not rising as fast as the foreign money-fed London market, but they are still rising back towards the peak prices of 2007 (as this chart shows) and the problem of people not being able to afford to buy is far, far from confined to the capital.

As our last post – There may be trouble ahead – focused on, the problem is going to get worse when bank rates start to rise and borrowers have to confront the consequences of unaffordable, major debt (well, at some point we had to justify the title, though we freely admit the title came before the post!).

The Government’s principal attempted solution so far, the Help to Buy Mortgage Guarantee Scheme, has had an effect in enabling some purchasers to get on the housing ladder but as Danny Dorling points out in All that is Solid: The Great Housing Disaster, one of the consequences is to support and possibly further increase house prices (in the first six months of the scheme, applicants were assisted to buy 31 properties valued at over £500,000; one in ten applicants had an annual household income of over £80,000). This in turn may contribute to financial risks (a point the International Monetary Fund recently noted). It will also allow rents to remain high. If rents are high, the housing benefit bill stays high.

The next proposed solution, Affordable Rent to Buy, has some attractive features: Government will provide loans to landlords to enable them to build new houses; and those properties will have to be let out at an “Affordable Rent” (i.e. 80% of market rent) for at least the first seven years. This may provide an opportunity for some would-be purchasers to save money that would otherwise be put towards the rent but it strikes us as falling far short of what is needed. In any event, the developer would be able to sell the property to anyone after seven years. This does not make building to rent profitable; it merely provides public funding to boost the profits of those willing to build for a deferred sale (at minimal risk – the loan will be provided at a low interest rate).

The nettle will of course not be grasped before 2015; we fear it will not be grasped afterwards. If not, then we do not expect to see any change in the current imbalance. Young people now draining their bank balances for rent or living at home hoping to save faster than prices rise may see their prospects disappearing further and further into space. Can you hear me, major debt? It is even a commonplace – “generation rent” will never own. Can you hear me, rent control?

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